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[A] reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and 
another can use it only as a mask.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Many people, it seems, are concerned throughout their lives in 
varying ways with how others think about or are affected by them—
that is, their status, prestige, influence, or reputation.2 Similar 
judgments are ubiquitous in our legal culture. They often guide a 
student’s choice of law school, a lawyer’s choice of firm, area of prac-
tice, or which judge to clerk for, or a client’s choice of attorney, to 
name just a few. They also often guide our views about individual 
judges, whether on the U.S. Supreme Court3 or lower courts,4 both 
within a particular period and across time. 
                                                                                                                     
 * Donald P. Klekamp Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
This Essay was prepared for the symposium on Empirical Measures of Judicial Perform-
ance in the Florida State University Law Review. Discussions at various times with a 
number of people, especially Mitu Gulati and Larry Lessig, have greatly aided my thinking 
on this topic. I am particularly grateful for early discussions with Larry Lessig that even-
tually culminated in our article, see infra note 21. This Essay benefited from the comments 
of participants in the University of Cincinnati College of Law Summer Scholarship series 
and from comments on an earlier draft by Mitu Gulati, Richard Posner, and James 
Walker. Any errors that remain are mine. 
 1.  A quote of Judge Learned Hand. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 
(2d Cir. 1928).  
 2. See ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY (2004); MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS 
SYNDROME: HOW SOCIAL STANDING AFFECTS OUR HEALTH AND LONGEVITY (2004) (discuss-
ing how social hierarchy affects health); cf. ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO: THE LOGIC OF 
HUMAN DESTINY 26-27 (2000) (arguing that pursuit of social status is characteristic of all 
human history and prehistory); Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 
1, 3 (1992) (drawing from psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics and asserting 
that “[w]hether it is termed ‘status,’ ‘prestige,’ or ‘distinction,’ people sometimes seek—as 
an end in itself—relative position”). 
 3. E.g., LEADERS OF THE PACK: POLLS & CASE STUDIES OF GREAT SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 2003). 
 4. E.g., Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the 
Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1141, 1143 
(2002) (referring to well-known lower federal court judges Henry Friendly, Learned Hand, 
Richard Posner, and Frank Easterbrook). 
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 Status and reputation also guide our view of multimember courts. 
For example, we often speak, if only indirectly, of differences in repu-
tation of the U.S. courts of appeals5 or of the U.S. Supreme Court at 
different periods in its history.6 We have a sense of some courts 
dominating others, either in quality, importance, or by other com-
parative measures. Whether speaking of individual judges or the 
courts on which they sit, studies of quality immediately run into 
measurement problems. Status, reputation, and similar concepts 
seem largely subjective. One way to deal with the problem is to em-
ploy various types of citation analysis. Determining how often a par-
ticular judge or court has been cited by others can potentially draw 
more objective differences between judges and courts. 
 In the past decade there has been a boomlet of studies using cita-
tion analysis to gauge the reputation or influence of particular 
judges.7 Until recently, however, there has been little systematic 
study of the reputation or influence of multimember courts as such. 
My goal in this Essay is to fill some of that gap by exploring the 
reputations—both historically and at the present time—of the indi-
vidual U.S. courts of appeals. That is, I will compare and contrast the 
reputations of the thirteen (as the number stands now) courts of ap-
peals: the First through Eleventh Circuits, the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, and the Federal Circuit.8 
 This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II addresses and disentangles 
the concepts of reputation, prestige, and influence, particularly as 
they are used in the legal community. It considers various measures 
of those concepts, principally, though not only, through citation 
analysis. I address the pros and cons of that, and other measures, 
and I explore problems associated with attributing reputation to col-
lective entities, like multijudge courts. In Part III, I address efforts, 
                                                                                                                     
 5. President Clinton, for example, when announcing the Supreme Court nomination 
of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, referred to her service on “the second-highest court in our country.” Transcript of 
President’s Announcement and Judge Ginsburg’s Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1993, at 
A24. For a more recent example, see Chris Mooney, Circuit Breaker, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 
2003, at A14 (referring to the D.C. Circuit as “the second most powerful court in the United 
States”). 
 6. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF 
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 3-12 (3d ed. 1992); Jim Chen, Judicial Epochs in 
Supreme Court History: Sifting Through the Fossil Record for Stitches in Time and 
Switches in Nine, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 677 (2003). 
 7. Various types of citation analysis have been used for decades in the legal commu-
nity to gauge the impact of books, law review articles, court decisions, or judges, among 
other things. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 411-40 
(2001); Symposium, Interpreting Legal Citations, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 317 (2000). 
 8. Officially, each of the courts I am addressing is “known as the United States 
Court of Appeals for the [particular] circuit.” 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000). Nonetheless, in this 
Essay I will, for convenience, use the terms “courts of appeals” and “circuits” or “circuit 
courts” interchangeably. 
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both historical and contemporary, to measure the reputations of the 
courts of appeals. Initially, I consider various accounts from the 
popular press and other nonscholarly sources that attempt to rank 
the circuits. Then I turn to somewhat more objective measures, such 
as surveys of attorneys and federal judges, of the reputations of cir-
cuits. Finally, I consider how various studies of citation analysis of 
the influence of particular federal appellate judges can be brought to 
bear on the reputation of the circuits on which they sit. 
 As Part III outlines, historically and to some extent to the present 
day, the Second and D.C. Circuits have been regarded as enjoying 
the best reputation and most influence. Yet some, though not all, of 
the putatively objective measures of influence place the Seventh Cir-
cuit far above those two. In Part IV, I explore this apparent discon-
nect and conclude that a variety of factors have led, in general, to the 
overall homogenization of reputation among the circuits, with the no-
table apparent exceptions of the D.C., Second, and especially the 
Seventh Circuits. In the conclusion to the Essay, I briefly address 
whether reputation in this context remains a meaningful concept, of-
fer suggestions for future research, and link measures of circuit repu-
tation to the measurement of judicial performance in general. 
II.   MEASURING JUDICIAL REPUTATION, PRESTIGE, AND INFLUENCE: 
INDIVIDUAL JUDGES AND MULTIMEMBER COURTS 
 There is no simple way to define the obviously related ideas of 
reputation, prestige, and influence.9 Reputation seems to be the 
broadest concept. In one sense, it ties to the idea of recognition—that 
is, the difference in the degree to which some people or institutions 
are more conspicuous, or more noticed, than others. But reputation is 
not just recognition. A person might be well known because of a well-
publicized ad campaign, but it would not necessarily follow from this 
that he or she also has a reputation. What reputation adds to the 
concept of recognition is a glimpse of some part of one’s character. If 
someone has a reputation for honesty, that means that he or she is 
known for being honest. Conversely, if someone has a reputation for 
dishonesty, that means he or she is known for being dishonest. Repu-
tation captures some part of an individual’s character and projects 
that part into the future. It is a way of reckoning some part of what 
                                                                                                                     
 9. In the following discussion of these terms, I draw from JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 
O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 84-89 (1982); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 58-73 (1990); Gregory A. Caldeira, 
On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 84-85 (1983); David Klein & 
Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 371-72 (1999); and Rebecca L. Sandefur, Work and Honor 
in the Law: Prestige and the Division of Lawyers’ Labor, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 382, 383-84 
(2001). 
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some individual has been as an index of what he or she will be. It fol-
lows that reputation may be negative or positive.10 And in this way, 
we capture the difference between reputation on the one hand, and 
prestige and respect, on the other. For one may have a good or bad 
reputation as a judge, but only if one has a good reputation does one 
also have prestige, or respect, as a judge. One may have prestige for 
reasons other than a good reputation—prestige may come from asso-
ciations with prestigious institutions or people. 
 Further parsing of these concepts is unnecessary for present pur-
poses. Suffice it to say that, in this context, prestige typically means 
“the amount of respect, regard, or esteem” a judge enjoys among 
other judges or interested publics.11 Since not all judges are equally 
prestigious, the concept has an inherently comparative and hierar-
chical element: some judges will inevitably be regarded as more pres-
tigious, or as enjoying a higher reputation than others.12 Influence, in 
contrast, is “the extent to which the actions of one person have an ef-
fect on the views or behavior of others.”13 An influential judge is one 
whose opinions, or other work product, has affected the thinking or 
work product of the judges or other actors in the legal community. 
 In a simple world, we might imagine a simple linear relationship 
between legal reputation, prestige, and influence. A good judge would 
gain, by being a respected judge, prestige. Prestige and respect would 
build reputation, and once established, a good reputation would 
translate into influence. Influential judges would be those with the 
best reputation, and those with the best reputation would be those 
that were most influential. This simple world is not the one we in-
habit. For one thing, the causal arrows between these concepts can 
get complicated. For example, a judge with low prestige or reputation 
(or none at all) can come to be influential because other judges follow 
her lead simply due to stare decisis or because that judge fortuitously 
rendered decisions that, for good or ill, have high precedential value. 
More important, shot through all these notions of judgment are con-
ceptions of value, many of which are highly contested in our legal 
culture. To the extent that conceptions of value differ among indi-
viduals or among groups or classes of individuals, there are differ-
ences in views about good judges, or respected judges, or courts that 
enjoy good reputations. In short, an element of subjectivity becomes 
inherent in any discussion of reputation, prestige, and even influ-
ence. 
                                                                                                                     
 10. POSNER, supra note 9, at 58. 
 11. Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 9, at 371-72. 
 12. Sandefur, supra note 9, at 383-84. 
 13. Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 9, at 372. 
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 There is, then, no simple or uncontentious way to describe the 
great judge or to mark out the most respected or influential courts. 
But this has not stopped people from talking about great judges or 
speaking of influential courts. Typically, such judges served on the 
Supreme Court, state high courts, or the lower federal courts, and 
they all produced work products—published written opinions—that 
are more or less permanent, accessible at relatively low cost, and in 
effect are required (or strongly recommended) reading due to stare 
decisis.14 In the past, scholars have examined attributes of what can 
be called the judicial craft. It can include the literary quality of opin-
ions, the contribution the decisions make to the development of legal 
rules and principles, creativity, and skillful legal analysis, among 
other things.15 Still other factors are said to affect judicial reputation, 
some of which are largely or completely outside the control of the 
judge, such as longevity, pre-court or post-court careers, the prox-
imity in time of the judge’s career to the person gauging the judge’s 
reputation, personal integrity, and ability to persuade other judges 
(in a multimember court).16 
 Of course, many, perhaps most, of these factors would be consid-
ered by many people today as difficult to accurately or coherently 
measure, and hence subjective, or merely in the eye of the beholder.17 
In a similar vein, the correctness of decisions by the judges, in the 
eyes of the evaluator, might be said to determine reputation, in 
whole or in part.18 One way around the skepticism about measuring 
reputation and related concepts is to look for correlative objective 
measures. It is no surprise, then, that citation analysis has been em-
braced in various contexts as the desired objective measure. In the 
academic community, citations can be used to measure the influence 
of prior published work. Professional norms require that later work 
build upon and, more importantly for us, refer to the earlier work. 
The same holds true for legal academic work and court opinions. Ci-
                                                                                                                     
 14. By contrast, compare the environment for a smart and thoughtful trial judge. Not 
all of her decisions may be rendered by written and accessible opinions; those that are not 
published in official reporters bind no one and thus suffer in influence. None of this is to 
say that the judge cannot enjoy a high reputation; but it will likely be restricted geographi-
cally to the lawyers that practice before her, and perhaps to nearby judges. 
 15. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial 
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 523-24 (1994) (book review); William G. Ross, The Ratings 
Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 404-05, 409 
(1996). 
 16. Ross, supra note 15, at 411-42 (discussing these and other factors). 
 17. Linda Przybyszewski, The Dilemma of Judicial Biography or Who Cares Who Is 
the Great Appellate Judge? Gerald Gunther on Learned Hand, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 
138-51 (1996) (book review). But cf. Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 1365 (2005) (arguing that criteria for judicial excellence can be developed 
and applied in a principled manner). 
 18. Ross, supra note 15, at 405-11. 
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tations, then, have come to be used as a convenient proxy for reputa-
tion, prestige, and influence.19 “Presumably, the best opinions will be 
cited more often than others.”20 
 Citation analysis would seem to best serve as the measure of in-
fluence since frequent citation would, of itself, not necessarily trans-
late to prestige or reputation. Yet even in that arena, the limits of ci-
tation analysis are well documented. Some of the possible drawbacks 
include: most studies do not distinguish between favorable or critical 
citations; many citations may reflect little more than the longevity of 
a judge’s career or the age of an opinion; a citation may be used to 
bolster an already-reached result; many citations are buried in string 
cites or are the result of self-citation; certain “superprecedents” on 
long-established and well-accepted principles may cease to be cited at 
all; and given that legal opinions are a public good, there are no costs 
associated with citing more or fewer cases on a particular point, so 
small differences in the perceived quality of opinions may lead to 
disproportionate disparities in the citation of cases.21 
 For many of the same reasons, citation analysis is at best an im-
perfect measure of the reputation of the authority being cited. Simply 
being cited a great deal does not mean a particular decision (or the 
judge that authored it) enjoys a high reputation, and the reverse is 
true as well. On the one hand, a particular decision may be the sub-
ject of frequent citation largely because it deals with an oft-litigated 
topic, not because it is a particularly admirable discussion of the 
topic.22 On the other hand, as just observed, a particular case, due to 
its landmark quality, may come to be so embedded in legal thought 
that later citation is thought to be less necessary or not necessary at 
all.23 All of which is to say that the quantity of citations does not 
automatically translate into a barometer of the quality of the work 
being cited—though it is not unrelated either. It is difficult to believe 
                                                                                                                     
 19. POSNER, supra note 7, at 421-24. 
 20. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299, 306 
(2004). 
 21. POSNER, supra note 7, at 425-28; William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael 
E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-76 (1998). 
 22. A study of frequently cited U.S. courts of appeals decisions illustrates this point. 
See Robert Schriek, Most-Cited U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases from 1932 Until the Late 
1980s, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 317, 322-23 (1991). Of the nineteen most-cited cases decided after 
1932, the top three were decisions that, respectively, clarified the standard for deciding a 
directed verdict motion in a civil case; set out criteria for awarding attorney’s fees in civil 
rights actions; and held that decisions of the former Fifth Circuit were precedent for the 
then-new Eleventh Circuit. Id. (discussing Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 
1969); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); and Bonner 
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981)). 
 23. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Em-
pirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976). 
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that a particular decision, thought brilliant by some or many, would 
not undergo significant citation later. 
 Another reason for caution when using citation analysis, or any 
other measure, to study judicial reputation is the scope of the audi-
ence. Many studies are not entirely clear on whose opinion of reputa-
tion is being directly, or indirectly, studied. Within the confines of ci-
tation analysis, when examining the decisions of an intermediate ap-
pellate court, such as the U.S. courts of appeals, do we look to cita-
tions by the Supreme Court? by courts of appeals (intra- or intercir-
cuit) themselves? by federal district courts? by legal academics? by 
nonlegal policymakers? All of these audiences have their own differ-
ing perceptions of the reputations of the courts of appeals.24 Given 
the relatively low public profile that the courts of appeals as a whole, 
and the circuit judges in particular, have compared to, say, the Su-
preme Court,25 probably the judges, practitioners, and academics who 
closely follow court of appeals decisionmaking would be the most 
fruitful audience to survey. 
 A final point is to consider whether it is meaningful to speak of 
the reputation of a multimember court as a whole, as opposed to the 
reputations of the judges who constitute that court. With rare excep-
tions,26 the studies of legal reputation deal with a particular judge or 
a particular case, not with an entire court as such. One might con-
clude that there is no useful distinction between the two concepts. 
Speaking again of the U.S. courts of appeals, “one could argue that a 
circuit’s influence is nothing more than the average of the influence 
of its judges.”27 Even if the circuit can be said to possess a reputation 
separate from the judges, “it would be difficult to disentangle it from 
the influence of the individual judges in the circuit.”28 If one circuit 
follows a case from another, how do we know if the invocation is to 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal 
Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 505 (1989). 
 25. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of 
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 618 (2000) (observing that even “ordinary” Su-
preme Court Justices have much more attention in the press than “non-ordinary” lower 
court judges like Roger Traynor or Henry Friendly); see also William M. Landes & Richard 
A. Posner, Citations, Age, Fame, and the Web, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 329-36 (2000) (ex-
plaining that a study of references to judges and legal scholars on websites and newspa-
pers indicates that, with the exception of Robert Bork, Supreme Court Justices are at the 
top of the list, with Richard Posner, Guido Calabresi, Frank Easterbrook, Jerome Frank, 
and Henry Friendly trailing behind). 
 26. The principle exception is Greg Caldeira’s intercourt citation analysis of state su-
preme courts. See Caldeira, supra note 9. 
 27. Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 21, app. at 327. 
 28. Id. 
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acknowledge the author of the opinion or the reputation of the circuit 
from which it came, or both?29 
 Yet, there are several reasons to suggest that there are meaning-
ful distinctions between the reputations of judges and the courts they 
compose. First, it is common, I think, in legal discourse to refer to the 
“court’s opinion” or the “court’s decision” more often than the decision 
of a particular judge. This may be for convenience, or it may reflect a 
lack of knowledge of the author of the opinion; either way it suggests 
that the court, as a collective entity, has a reputational existence 
apart from that of its members (with the reverse being true as well). 
 Second, there are institutional constraints in place that, at least 
in part, suggest that a circuit is an entity separate from the judges, 
and indeed from other circuits. Start with the fact that (with the ex-
ception of the Federal Circuit) the circuits have nonoverlapping geo-
graphic boundaries. All of the judges are paid equally and seniority 
plays little role, other than to determine who will serve as chief 
judge.30 With regard to decisionmaking, most of the work is done via 
three-judge panels, subject to override by the circuit sitting en banc.31 
Those panels are typically constituted by random selection,32 and the 
membership of the panels are often not revealed to counsel until 
shortly before oral argument.33 With a few exceptions, three-judge 
panels must follow circuit precedent.34 While non-circuit judges (that 
is, visiting judges from other circuits or district judges sitting by des-
ignation) are members of a significant number of three-judge pan-
els,35 their decisions still carry the authority of the circuit. Finally, 
most courts of appeals decisions are signed by the presumed lead au-
thor; the exceptions are unsigned short orders (often not officially 
                                                                                                                     
 29. One way to partially deal with this problem is through the use of “invocation” 
studies to determine those occasions where a court gratuitously refers to the name of the 
judge who authors the opinion. See Part III, infra, for a discussion of these studies. 
 30. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44(d), 45 (2000) (regarding judicial salaries and appointment of 
the chief judge, respectively). 
 31. See id. § 46(c) (providing for en banc procedure). For discussion of en banc process, 
see Tracey E. George & Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United 
States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171, 176-80 (2001). 
 32. J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the 
Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1069-78 (2000) (describing practices of all of the 
circuits). 
 33. E.g., 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 34 (one week before oral argument); 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 34(c)(2) 
(two weeks before oral argument); 11TH CIR. R. 34-4, I.O.P. 7 (one week before oral argu-
ment or earlier as determined by the court). See generally Brown & Lee, supra note 32, at 
1075-78 tbl. 1 (summarizing notification practices from all of the circuits). 
 34. Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for Increasing 
the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805, 822 (1993). 
 35. JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 38-39 (1993). 
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published) or per curiam opinions.36 The long tradition has been for 
decisions to be reached and opinions to be drafted in a collegial man-
ner, that is, they are not simply the work product of one judge.37 
 Third, it seems unlikely that circuits qua circuits will engage in 
strategic behavior when it comes to burnishing their reputation. 
Even if individual judges might be inclined to do this,38 to imagine 
circuits inflating citations to other circuits, expecting increased cita-
tion in return, imagines extensive collective action. The high cost of 
such collective action that would be required for two or more circuits 
to collude makes it extremely unlikely that circuit citation practice is 
in any meaningful sense exaggerated.39 
III.   MEASURING THE REPUTATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
OF APPEALS 
 In this Part, I consider various sources that, directly or indirectly, 
can be said to gauge the historical and contemporary reputations of 
the federal courts of appeals. In Part IV, I will offer explanations for 
some of the patterns that emerge. I focus on the courts of appeals, 
since there has been relatively little attention given them, as collec-
tive entities, in the emerging literature on judicial prestige and in-
fluence. And I focus on reputation, because it too has not been the 
subject of extensive inquiry. There has been a good bit of citation 
analysis, but as already mentioned, it is a tool that best measures in-
fluence. Which is again not to say that the concepts are unrelated or 
that statistical or other measures of influence cannot be brought to 
bear when thinking about prestige or reputation. They do, as will 
soon be demonstrated. 
 The history and current institutional status of the courts of appeals 
is familiar, and only a brief overview is necessary here. The courts of 
appeals, as we know them, began business in 1891. Prior to that, there 
were no intermediate appeals courts in the modern sense in the fed-
eral system. The 1789 Judiciary Act had established district and cir-
cuit courts. The latter had original jurisdiction over some matters and 
appellate authority over certain types of civil and other cases. The cir-
cuit courts, however, did not have their own judges. They were staffed 
                                                                                                                     
 36. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 173-74 
(1996) (finding that only about six percent of opinions published in 1994 in the Federal Re-
porter, Third Series, were per curiam). 
 37. Whether the tradition always holds true is another matter. See generally Harry T. 
Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 
(2003). 
 38. Choi & Gulati, supra note 20, at 308-09 (arguing that strategic behavior by judges 
in this regard is unlikely given the existence of frequently rotating three-judge panels and 
norms of cooperation). 
 39. Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 21, app. at 327. 
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by district judges and Supreme Court Justices sitting on circuit.40 
There initially were three geographically distinct circuits,41 but other 
circuits were added as the nation’s territory expanded, eventually 
reaching nine.42 Judges who specifically sat on the circuits were even-
tually authorized as well,43 but various problems with the lack of a 
formal intermediate appellate court44 led to their creation by the 
Evarts Act in 1891.45 The new circuit courts of appeals had their own 
judges and were geographically distributed in a manner very similar 
to today. Formal changes since then have been few; the present Tenth 
Circuit was carved out of the Eighth in 1926, and the present Eleventh 
Circuit was carved out of the Fifth in 1980. In 1982, Congress created 
the Federal Circuit, which sits in Washington, D.C., but has national 
appellate jurisdiction over patent and various other specialized cases.46 
 Today, many formal aspects of the thirteen circuits are uniform, 
such as pay and the disposition of most cases by three-judge panels. 
But some things are different. The number of states and their popu-
lations differ,47 as does the number of authorized active judges, 
which currently ranges from six (First Circuit) to twenty-eight 
(Ninth Circuit).48 No doubt, many other things could be added to the 
                                                                                                                     
 40. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 29 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 35. 
 43. Id. at 36. 
 44. Id. at 36-37. 
 45. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. The old circuit courts remained in exis-
tence, but their appellate jurisdiction was abolished; the circuit courts themselves were en-
tirely abolished in 1911. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 37 n.65. 
 46. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 42-43. For useful overviews of the history of 
the courts of appeals, see THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS 
OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1-13 (1994); COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES 
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: FINAL REPORT 7-28 (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION 
REPORT]. A map of the current circuits is found in the Appendix, infra, at page 1363. 
 47. As of 1998, the population within each circuit ranged from 528,964 (D.C.) and 
13,337,709 (1st) to 30,236,545 (6th) and 51,453,880 (9th). Five of the circuits cover three states; 
the Ninth Circuit covers eleven states. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at 27 tbl.2-9. 
 48. The current breakdown is as follows: 
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list.49 One thing that has differed, at least starting in the 1920s,50 
has been the reputation of the various circuits. From that time, up 
to the present, there is considerable, if uneven, evidence, culled 
from the popular press and various other sources, in which one or 
two circuits have had excellent reputations, above the rest, in vari-
ous quarters of the legal community. 
 Over much of the twentieth century, the conventional wisdom has 
ranked the Second and District of Columbia Circuits highest with re-
gard to prestige and influence. For example, in 1974 Washington 
journalist Joseph C. Goulden, in his entertaining survey of federal 
judges, labeled the D.C. Circuit as “the second most important court 
in the United States.”51 According to Goulden, this was due to “the 
court’s jurisdiction over appeals of decisions of a host of key federal 
regulatory agencies” and the fact that few such cases are reviewed by 
the Supreme Court.52  Similar comments in the modern press are not 
difficult to find.53 During the New Deal, President Roosevelt presci-
ently noted that the D.C. Circuit had “taken on a wholly new impor-
tance in the last few years [and] is now easily the second most impor-
tant Federal Court in the country.”54 Many judges on that court have 
been drawn from a national pool,55 and over the years the D.C. Cir-
                                                                                                                     
 
 49. See Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization in the Federal 
Courts of Appeals: Implications for Case Processing (2000) (unpublished paper presented 
at the 2000 annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, on file with the 
author) (documenting differences among the circuits regarding caseload, docket composi-
tion, use of oral argument, opinion publication, and size of staffs, among other things). 
 50. Though I make no claim to have thoroughly canvassed the possible historical 
sources, I have found relatively few discussions in the sources consulted and cited in this 
Essay of the reputations of the courts of appeals from 1891 to the 1920s or, for that matter, 
for the circuit courts prior to 1891. I tend to think there were differing reputations, and 
that at least to some degree they influenced the modern reputations discussed in this Es-
say. For example, the distinctive reputational flavor of the modern D.C. Circuit might be 
traced, in part, to the unique federal trial and appellate courts that Congress has created 
for the District of Columbia since 1789. See CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN 
THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT 7-10 (1999) (tracing the complicated historical roots of the mod-
ern D.C. Circuit). On the other hand, perhaps the phenomenon of the appellate court repu-
tation is closely linked to the appointment of Learned Hand to the Second Circuit in 1924. 
See infra note 60. 
 51. JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE 
POWERFUL FEDERAL JUDGES 252 (1974). 
 52. Id.; see also BANKS, supra note 50, at 2-3. 
 53. E.g., Paul M. Barrett, In Rare Reversal, Court Blocks Libel Suit over Book Review, 
WALL ST. J., May 4, 1994, at B1; Marilyn Berger, David Bazelon Dies at 83; Jurist Had 
Wide Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1993, at 38; Katherine Marsh, Ideology Matters: The 
Estrada Filibuster and the Politics of Confirmation, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 56, 56; 
Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dissent: The Fight over the President’s Judicial Nominations, 
NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 42, 43. 
 54. Cable from President Roosevelt to Charles E. Clark (Aug. 19, 1937), quoted in 
SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM 
ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 26 (1997). 
 55. BANKS, supra note 50, at 3-4; Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 
48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159 (1993). 
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cuit has been a source of jurists seriously considered by Presidents 
for appointment to the Supreme Court, with several actual appoint-
ments.56 
 Similarly, the respect historically given the Second Circuit is often 
attributed to the brilliance of the judges who have served on the 
court, as well as to the commercial and other important issues de-
cided by that court.57 These accounts were echoed by federal judges58 
and academic commentators.59 Even more so than the D.C. Circuit, I 
think, the Second Circuit’s reputation is closely aligned with that of 
the well-known judges that served on it—starting with Learned 
Hand, who served from 1924 to 1961,60 but also including Charles 
Clark, Jerome Frank, Augustus Hand, and Henry Friendly, among 
others.61 
                                                                                                                     
 56. BANKS, supra note 50, at 4 (noting that one-third of the current Court formerly sat 
on the D.C. Circuit (Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas) and that other 
judges have either been nominated (Bork) or placed on short lists (Douglas Ginsburg) for 
consideration). It is also worth mentioning that Chief Justices Fred Vinson and Warren 
Burger also served on the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 125. 
 57. E.g., Margaret A. Jacobs, Court Finds Limits on Insurance Held by Asbestos 
Firms, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1994, at B7; The Talk of the Town: George’s Choice, NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 18, 1993, at 31, 31 (“[T]he Second Circuit is often called the second most im-
portant court in the nation.”). Indeed, one measure of influence or reputation could be to 
determine the comparative coverage or mention of the circuits in the popular press, cf. Lee 
Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000) (meas-
uring coverage of Supreme Court decisions in The New York Times), or in the legal press 
(for example, determining how often the circuits are mentioned in The National Law Jour-
nal or have decisions summarized in United States Law Week). 
 58. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 142 (1981) 
(noting that a survey of circuit judges in the late 1960s found that they regarded the Sec-
ond Circuit “as the front-runner [in prestige] for reasons of its business, its bench, and its 
bar” with the D.C. Circuit coming in second). 
 59. Id. at xix (referring to the Second Circuit as “the nation’s leading commercial 
court”); MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 5 (1970) (referring to the Second Circuit 
“as one of the top appellate courts in the history of the country”). 
 60. It is difficult to overstate the prestige of Judge Hand. He was the subject of a mag-
isterial biography eleven years ago, GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE 
JUDGE (1994), which spawned further discussion of judicial biography in general and of 
Hand in particular. See Symposium, National Conference on Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 485 (1995); Posner, supra note 15; Przybyszewski, supra note 17. Virtually every 
modern discussion of judge and court reputation makes some mention of Judge Hand, over 
four decades after his death. 
 61. Clark, while Dean of Yale Law School, was instrumental in drafting the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976).  
 Frank was a prominent New Deal lawyer and a famed legal realist. See Robert Jerome 
Glennon, The Role of a Circuit Judge in Shaping Constitutional Law: Jerome Frank’s In-
fluence on Supreme Court, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 524-25. 
 Augustus Hand was Learned’s first cousin, and he was highly thought of in his own 
right. Augustus sat on the Second Circuit from 1927 to 1954. For further discussion of the 
tenure of the Hand cousins on that circuit, see Michael E. Solimine, Nepotism in the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 563, 579-80 (2002). 
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 Yet until very recently, there had been little effort to empirically 
inform these assumptions, particularly, though not only, through the 
comparison of one circuit (or particular judge) to another.62 In one 
study, Marvin Schick, focusing on the decades Learned Hand served 
on the Second Circuit, examined how often the circuits were re-
viewed by the Supreme Court. He found that between 1941 and 1951 
the Second Circuit was reviewed the most but reversed the second 
least; both findings were, according to him, indicia of the circuit’s 
prestige and influence.63 In another study, J. Woodford Howard ex-
amined citation practices in three circuit courts (D.C., Second, and 
Fifth) from 1965 to 1967. He found, among other things, that the 
Ninth Circuit was cited most often by the other three circuits, while 
the rest of the circuits (including the Second) were cited at about the 
same rate by each other.64 The D.C. Circuit came in last.65 A more re-
cent study examined the most-cited courts of appeals cases from mid-
1932 to mid-1988.66 Of the nineteen most-cited cases, six were from 
                                                                                                                     
 Friendly was a highly esteemed lawyer who, after his appointment, made significant con-
tributions to, among other things, securities law. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hind-
sight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 796-98 (2004); Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the 
Law of Securities Regulation: The Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777 
(1997). Friendly also made significant contributions to administrative law. See A. Raymond 
Randolph, Administrative Law and the Legacy of Henry J. Friendly, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 
(1999).  
 Perhaps the reputation of a circuit can be strengthened, or diminished, by the prestige of 
federal district judges who sit in the circuit. Consider, for example, district judges Edward 
Weinfield and Jack Weinstein in the Second Circuit or John Sirica of Watergate fame in 
the D.C. Circuit. This is not to denigrate esteemed U.S. district judges in other circuits, 
such as Charles Wyzanski in the First and Frank Johnson in the Fifth, just to name two. 
Still, it is interesting that most of the famed circuit judges discussed in this Essay were not 
formerly district judges, with the Hand cousins being a notable exception to the generaliza-
tion. A fuller exploration of district judge reputation and its effect on circuit reputation is 
beyond the scope of this Essay. For discussion, see Karen Swenson, Federal District Court 
Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST. SYS. J. 121, 136 (2004); cf. Ahmed E. Taha, 
Publish or Paris? Evidence of How Judges Allocate Their Time, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 14 
(2004) (linking publication decisions of U.S. district courts with norms of publication of the 
circuits in which they sit). 
 62. Marvin Schick remarked on this absence in 1970. SCHICK, supra note 59, at 348-
50. 
 63. Id. at 334-36. 
 64. HOWARD, supra note 58, at 143 tbl.5.6.  
 65. Id. For a subsequent effort to statistically measure the reputation and influence of 
one judge (Jerome Frank) by determining how often opinions he authored or dissented 
from were reviewed by the Supreme Court, see Glennon, supra note 61, at 528-31. 
 66. Schriek, supra note 22, at 317. Schriek began his study in 1932 because the Fed-
eral Reporter prior to that date was not limited to publishing courts of appeals cases. Id. at 
317 n.1. The citing sources included, apparently, all other courts, and Schriek did not dif-
ferentiate between intra- and intercircuit citations. See id. at 320-22. Although the pre-
1932 cases were not systematically examined, the two most-cited cases from that era were 
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (Van Orsdel, J.), and Cohan v. Commis-
sioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). 
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the Second Circuit (including two authored by Learned Hand), and 
six were from the D.C. Circuit.67 
 These studies are interesting and important and, as we shall see 
in a moment, served as useful models for more recent work. And they 
largely support the conventional wisdom of the prominence of the 
Second and D.C. Circuits. Nonetheless, they are not definitive given 
their age and the limited coverage of judges, courts, or decisions can-
vassed. It is to the more recent studies that I now turn. 
 First consider the view of attorneys. One helpful source is the Al-
manac of the Federal Judiciary, which profiles each circuit and 
quotes attorneys who litigate before those courts.68 Not unexpectedly, 
attorneys in the Second and D.C. Circuits gave these circuits the 
highest compliments.69 But attorneys in almost all of the other cir-
cuits also gave their own courts the highest compliments, sometimes 
comparing themselves favorably to the Second and D.C. Circuits.70 
The weight given these remarks must be discounted by the small 
sample size, their anecdotal and probably parochial nature, and the 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Schriek, supra note 22, at 322-30. The cases, from highest to lowest citations, 
were: Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969) (Ainsworth, J.); Johnson v. 
Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (Roney, J.); Bonner v. City of 
Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (Godbold, C.J.); United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 
F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (Moore, J.); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 
1968) (Waterman, J.); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 
1958) (per curiam); Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Seitz, C.J.); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (Medina, J.); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (Kaufman, J.); 
Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (Aldisert, J.); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Burger, J.); 
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.); Dur-
ham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (Bazelon, J.); Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinat-
ing Committee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (Wright, J.); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(Rosenn, J.); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (5th 
Cir. 1969) (en banc) (per curiam); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, 
C.J.); and Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (McGowan, J.). 
 68. The Almanac mentions that it surveys a “cross-section” of attorneys, but it makes 
no claims of having made a scientific survey of lawyers, or of having polled them with the 
same questions. See 1 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at Intro. 1 (2005). 
 69. For comments on the Second Circuit, see 2 id. at 2d Cir. 1 (“definitely one of the 
better circuits”; “[t]he Second Circuit is top notch, the best in the United States”; “the cir-
cuit has been a preeminent leader on business issues”). For comments on the D.C. Circuit, 
see 2 id. at D.C. Cir. 1 (“one of the best [court of appeals] in the country”; “[a]lmost all of 
these judges are way above the average judge”; “[t]hese judges have all developed an ex-
pertise in administrative and regulatory law”; “uniformly impressive”). 
 70. See, e.g., 2 id. at 1st Cir. 1 (“very scholarly”; “outstanding intellectual body”); 2 id. 
at 5th Cir. 1 (“[O]n the whole, the Fifth Circuit is on equal level with New York and D.C. 
and in the top 10-percent or so.”); 2 id. at 7th Cir. 1 (“excellent court,” “one of the best 
courts in the country,” particularly emphasizing presence of Judges Posner and Easter-
brook); 2 id. at Federal Cir. 1 (“The court’s legal ability is very good.”). But see 2 id. at 6th 
Cir. 1 (“It’s a solid circuit, but not scholarly.”); 2 id. at 10th Cir. 1 (“But if the Tenth Circuit 
still lags behind others, such as the Seventh Circuit, we’re not behind by a big margin.”). 
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fact that many of the attorneys surveyed did not have extensive ap-
pellate experience in other circuits, thus making comparisons diffi-
cult. 
 Next, consider David Klein’s recent study of the courts of appeals, 
in which he reports his interviews of twenty-four appellate judges 
from six circuits.71 The respondents were asked whether, in deciding 
cases, they gave particular weight to the decisions of certain judges 
or other courts.72 The bottom line answer is, for most judges in most 
cases, not much. Most of them gave weight to what positions other 
circuits had taken on a particular issue, how many circuits had 
reached the issue, and whether there was a circuit split. The identity 
of the circuits was typically less important.73 Klein reports the follow-
ing “typical” reactions to questions on whether circuits have discern-
able reputations: 
 I really don’t think so. When I was young, there was the Second 
Circuit, with Hand, Frank, and Swan. All the circuits are bigger 
now with their membership constantly changing. When you get 
circuits that big, it’s not likely that you can have star courts.74 
 That’s a will-o’-the-wisp I wouldn’t trust as far as I could throw 
it. When you back away and look, it’s hard to say.75 
 No. That’s a dichotomy between the public and judges. Most fed-
eral judges would feel no one circuit is better than the others. The 
reasons: One, composition changes rapidly. There may be good 
judges on it now, but bad judges may join, the good may leave. 
Two, the difference in the size of the circuits. Some are so big they 
can’t have a single reputation.76 
In contrast, some of the judges did react negatively to the reputation 
of the Ninth Circuit: 
 The Ninth Circuit, of course, though it has great individual 
judges, is so large and its jurisprudence is so diversified over a 
tremendous area that it doesn’t have the same jurisprudential in-
tegrity I think we have.77 
                                                                                                                     
 71. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 18-19 
(2002) (outlining methodology of interviews). Ten judges were from the Sixth Circuit, five 
from the Third Circuit, four from the Seventh Circuit, two each from the First and Elev-
enth Circuits, and one from the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 18, 19 n.10. 
 72. Klein asked the judges if “there [are] any circuits today which have a reputation 
for general excellence or which in your view merit such a reputation,” and if they would be 
“more inclined to adopt rules from certain courts or judges than others.” Id. app. B at 168-
69. 
 73. See id. at 57, 89-92. 
 74. Id. at 92.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
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 I’ve seen a tendency on the part of judges to recoil from, reject 
anything from the Ninth Circuit, because they’re way out there, do 
a lot of experimenting with the law. There are a lot of knee-jerk 
reactions by other judges; they tend to discount any precedent 
from the Ninth—consider it too liberal, activist.78 
In sum, according to Klein, “Judges typically do not think of whole 
circuits in evaluative terms and so do not weight precedents accord-
ing to the circuit they come from.”79 
 Klein’s respondents had some different views on the authors of 
decisions from other circuits, as “most felt that the name on the opin-
ion did affect their decision making at times.”80 As reported by Klein, 
some of their reactions were as follows: 
 Once in a great while I feel an initial kick because it’s from a 
great judge—say Friendly or Wisdom. But usually it’s the opinion 
itself, if it’s a thoughtful opinion.81 
 I guess it might matter. I wouldn’t distinguish by circuit. There 
are certain judges I know and have a lot of respect for. If I find 
they said something, I might give it a little more weight. Maybe 
“weight” is not the right word. I think through the case myself, but 
if a judge I respect agreed exactly with my position, I’d feel more 
satisfied, while if that judge were diametrically opposed I would 
pause.82 
 Sure, the better the judge, the more seriously you take them. 
Some people you know personally, others just through opinions, 
but you form a sense of how good they are through their work.83 
 I think so. If it’s a judge I know or who is reputed for his scholar-
ship or legal acumen, I will probably give greater deference than if 
the judge is unknown or has a lesser reputation.84 
 Oh, yeah. There are some I think I’m more simpatico with. Also, 
I certainly take note of ones from Posner. I’m impressed by Kearse, 
Oakes, and some others on the Second Circuit. This is factored in 
almost unconsciously. Judge Winter is just too conservative. He’s 
supposed to be a fine judge, but I’m not very impressed.85 
 Even if there isn’t a definitive body of law in other circuits but 
there’s an opinion by a judge, even a dissent—I respect some 
judges more than others. . . . For example, Noonan on ethics, Pos-
                                                                                                                     
 78. Id. at 92-93. 
 79. Id. at 93. 
 80. Id. at 94. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 95.  
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ner on economics. I would want to pick his brain. On the Four-
teenth Amendment, Bork.86 
 Next, consider the circuit’s relationship with the Supreme Court. 
Marvin Schick has suggested that the relationship may be a barome-
ter of reputation.87 The number of cases reviewed from a circuit might 
be considered to be some indication of the importance of the cases de-
cided by that circuit. Likewise, the higher the rate of affirmance by the 
Supreme Court in those cases, the more deference the Court is giving 
to that circuit, which might be some indication of the circuit’s prestige. 
For short periods of time, these factors might be meaningful. Much ink 
has been spilled lately, for example, on the disproportionately large 
number of cases from the Ninth Circuit reviewed, and often reversed 
by, the Supreme Court.88 Yet it is not clear that it has somehow less-
ened the reputation of that circuit. Moreover, over time, the rates of 
review and reversal of circuit opinions are quite similar,89 which 
makes it difficult to differentiate circuit prestige on that basis.90 
 This is not to say that other aspects of the Supreme Court-circuit 
court relationship may not yield insights regarding circuit reputa-
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id. (omission in original). 
 87. See SCHICK, supra note 59, at 336. 
 88. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7, at 412-20; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of the 
Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2003); Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: 
Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 425 (2000); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The Supreme Court, 
the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998); Stephen L. Wasby, The Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeals En Bancs, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 17 (2001). 
 89. According to data compiled by Lee Epstein and her colleagues, the number of deci-
sions reviewed on the merits from each circuit, from the 1946 through the 2001 Terms, 
ranged from 127 of the Eleventh Circuit (only operating from 1981) to 759 of the Ninth Cir-
cuit. The rates of affirmance ranged from a low of 30.9% (D.C. Circuit) to a high of 47.8% 
(Second Circuit). LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 697-99 tbl.7-29 (3d ed. 2003). The totals for the reviewed decisions from 


















































 90. Even if there were meaningful differences between the circuits in this regard, it is 
doubtful that Supreme Court review and affirmance would be a good surrogate for reputa-
tion. The Court, no doubt, considers a host of factors when deciding whether to grant certio-
rari in a case. These factors can include the perceived importance of the issue presented in 
the case; the presence or absence of a conflict with other circuits; how far the issue may have 
percolated among the circuits; the need for uniformity on this issue of federal law; and the 
correctness of the decision below. See George & Solimine, supra note 31, at 174-75 (providing 
a brief review of scholarly literature on the certiorari process). It is not obvious how these fac-
tors, other than the first and perhaps the last, directly speak to a circuit’s reputation. Indeed, 
the denial of certiorari can be regarded in some circumstances as the Court being deferential 
to the court below, thus reflecting well on the court or the author of the opinion. Glennon, su-
pra note 61, at 534 (giving example of Justice Harlan telling Learned Hand that a denial of 
certiorari in a case the latter authored really meant “‘Judgment Affirmed’”). That said, per-
haps review and affirmance as indicia of reputation carried more meaning when the Court 
was deciding more cases, and the courts of appeals fewer, than in recent decades. 
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tion. As one example, Court opinions sometimes specifically refer to 
the author of the opinion being reviewed (or of a dissenting opinion, 
or the author of some other, related case), even when citing conven-
tions do not require such a reference. This presumably reflects the 
greater authoritative weight that the Court wishes to give to the 
lower court opinion being referenced. Thus, in recent decisions, one 
finds specific reference in Court opinions to Judges Richard Posner, 
Frank Easterbrook, Robert Bork, and Harry Edwards (among living 
jurists), and to Judges Learned Hand and Henry Friendly (among ju-
rists who have passed away).91 Even here, though, the references are 
usually to judges, not to a three-judge panel as such.92 
 As another example, almost all of the clerks for Supreme Court 
Justices are recent law school graduates who have clerked for a court 
of appeals judge. Given the high prestige afforded those positions, 
the feeder judges (or circuits) for whom the clerks previously worked 
might also be afforded a high reputation. During the 1975 through 
2003 Terms, the circuits supplying the most clerks were the D.C. 
(36.4%), Ninth (15.1%), and Second (14.9%).93 No other circuit was 
above ten percent.94 
 Finally, several recent examples of citation analysis can shed light 
on the reputation of the circuits. The first is by William Landes, 
Lawrence Lessig, and myself.95 We examined the citations, by other 
                                                                                                                     
 91. From the 2003 Term alone, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754, 
2765 (2004) (referring to Friendly, Edwards, and Bork); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 
2711, 2731 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Bork); F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2367 (2004) (citing to L. Hand); Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 
2276, 2290 (2004) (referring to Easterbrook and Friendly); and Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & 
Sons Co., 124 S. Ct. 1836, 1842 (2004) (citing Friendly). 
 Judge Posner was not cited in the 2003 term, but he has been frequently cited by name 
before and after. See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 125 S. Ct. 1453, 1460 
(2005); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 1250 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Commis-
sioner v. Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826, 833 (2005); United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 752 
(2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rush Pruden-
tial HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 396 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Great-West 
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002). 
 92. Cf. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 480 n.2 (1999) (referring 
to a case with a “distinguished panel of the Second Circuit” (Frank, Clark, and L. Hand)); 
Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 216 & n.16 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring 
to the “unusually distinguished panel of Circuit Judges” who had decided a cited case (L. 
Hand, A. Hand, and Clark)); United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (referring to a Second Circuit opinion of a panel made up by Swan, Frank, 
and Learned Hand as “so strong a court and one so strong in literary endowment”). 
 93. E-mail from Lawrence Baum to Michael E. Solimine (July 19, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
 94. See id. The circuit breakdown is as follows: D.C. (36.4%); Ninth (15.1%); Second 
(14.9%); Fourth (9.9%); First (5.9%); Fifth (5.3%); Seventh (5.0%); Third (3.3%); Eleventh 
(1.5%); Tenth (1.2%); Eighth (1.0%); Sixth (0.5%). Id. The information supplied by Profes-
sor Baum is a follow-up to his article, Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law 
Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001). 
 95. Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 21. 
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courts of appeals, of published opinions authored by 205 appellate 
judges, with at least six years of service, sitting as of 1992. The data-
base included all published opinions by those judges; the earliest was 
rendered in 1955, the latest in 1995.96 Most pertinent for the present 
discussion, we ranked all of the judges by the number of citations to 
their opinions outside of their circuit. The top ten consisted solely of 
judges on the Seventh, First, and Second Circuits, with Judges Pos-
ner, Bruce Selya, and Easterbrook heading the list.97 We also aggre-
gated the judge-specific data by circuit, based on opinions published 
from 1982 to 1995.98 Once again, the most pertinent data from this 
part of the study are citations by other circuits, adjusted for the 
number of opinions generated by the circuit being cited. On that 
score, the Third Circuit, followed by the Second, D.C., and Seventh 
Circuits had the greatest influence.99 
 A second citation analysis study, by David Klein and Darby Mor-
risroe, examined how often courts of appeals judges were cited or 
mentioned by name in courts of appeals opinions.100 This is parallel to 
the earlier-described invocation studies, which examine how often 
circuit judges are mentioned in Supreme Court opinions. The authors 
examined references to a sample of 139 circuit judges sitting in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s.101 The judges with the most references 
were William Wilkins (Fourth Circuit), Stephen Breyer (then of the 
First Circuit), Posner, and Easterbrook.102 The frequent references to 
Judge Wilkins were “attributable largely to his service as chair of the 
United States Sentencing Commission.”103 
 Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati provide a third use of citation 
analysis to gauge circuit reputation.104 In the course of developing 
and applying criteria that seek to objectively measure the quality of a 
circuit judge’s opinions, Choi and Gulati studied (among other 
things) the citation of opinions published from 1998 to 2000 by circuit 
                                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 276-79 (describing methodology). 
 97. Id. at 288-92 tbl.2A. The top ten were as follows: Posner (Seventh Circuit); Selya 
(First Circuit); Easterbrook (Seventh Circuit); Coffin (First Circuit); Campbell (First Cir-
cuit); Cudahy (Seventh Circuit); Newman (Second Circuit); Bownes (First Circuit); Flaum 
(Seventh Circuit); Oakes (Second Circuit). 
 98. To compare just the circuits, we started in 1982, since that was the year the 11th 
Circuit began operations and publishing opinions. Id. app. at 328 n.72. 
 99. Id. app. at 332. 
 100. Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 9. 
 101. For further discussion of methodology, see id. at 377-80. The 139 judges were a 
sample of all active or senior circuit judges at the time, limited to those who wrote majority 
opinions in “287 circuit court cases involving issues not previously settled by the Supreme 
Court.” Id. at 377. 
 102. Id. at 381 tbl.2. 
 103. Id. at 382. 
 104. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004). 
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judges sitting as of June 2003.105 The top five judges, ranked with re-
gard to citations to their opinions outside of their respective circuits, 
were Posner and Easterbrook (Seventh Circuit); Sandra Lynch and 
Selya (First Circuit); and Paul Kelly (Tenth Circuit).106 By partially 
aggregating the data by circuit and controlling for number of opin-
ions, some of the circuits (such as the First and Third) have a high 
percentage of their judges with relatively high citation counts.107 In 
contrast, the D.C. Circuit was at the bottom of the list.108  
 What conclusions can be drawn from these various studies? Any 
conclusions should be drawn with care. Reputation is a difficult sub-
ject to objectively study. Couple that with the snapshot quality of 
most of the studies; they usually cover a relatively short period of 
time or only samples of the judges who constitute a circuit. That all 
said, at one point there was support for the conventional wisdom that 
the reputation of the Second and D.C. Circuits towered over the rest. 
However, in the past several decades, it seems, the reputations of 
those circuits have fallen to a degree, or perhaps one can say that the 
reputations of the other circuits have risen (or both). Put another 
way, there seems to be a homogenization of reputations among the 
circuits. There are exceptions to the point. One is the First Circuit, 
which perhaps quietly has had a high reputation in some quarters, 
as reflected to a degree in the good showing of judges from that cir-
cuit in my study with Landes and Lessig.109 A more notable exception 
is the Seventh Circuit, whose reputational stock has skyrocketed in 
the past two decades, related in no small way to the prestige afforded 
Judges Posner and Easterbrook, who joined that court in the 1980s. 
IV.   THE RISE AND FALL OF REPUTATIONS OF THE CIRCUITS 
 The prior Part demonstrates that the reputations of the U.S. 
courts of appeals are not static. In my view, the evidence shows that 
the prior high prestige of the Second and D.C. Circuits has, to some 
degree, lessened in the latter decades of the twentieth century. At 
the same time, the reputation of the Seventh Circuit has risen, and 
to varying degrees, the reputations of all of the circuits have risen. I 
draw these conclusions with caution; many of the studies previously 
discussed only focused on one court’s influence on another, not on 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. at 40-41 (generally describing methodology). 
 106. Id. at 50 tbl.4. For one of their measures of opinion quality, the authors limited 
the study to the top twenty opinions of each judge to restrict the bias attributable to each 
circuit publishing differing percentages of opinions. Id. at 52-54. When controlling for 
number of opinions in this way, the order was Lynch, Easterbrook, Kelly, Posner, and Se-
lya. Id. at 53 tbl.5. 
 107. Id. at 79 tbl.16.  
 108. Id. 
 109. See Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 21.  
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reputation as such. None of the studies are longitudinal in nature, 
and all draw from, or are directed at, different audiences. That said, 
the general contours of circuit reputation possess enough clarity to be 
worthy of study and explanation. An appropriate starting point to 
sketch out reasons for reputational differences is to focus on attrib-
utes of the court whose reputation is being studied and on the rela-
tions between those courts and other audiences—other courts and 
judges, lawyers, and other observers in the legal community.110 
 First, consider the rise of the Seventh Circuit’s reputation. That 
ascension can be traced almost directly to the appointments by 
President Reagan of Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook to that 
circuit in 1981 and 1985, respectively. Prior to that time, it is worth 
saying, “the Seventh Circuit was long considered an unremarkable 
circuit in terms of its work product.”111 But after those appointments, 
the entire circuit began producing more publishable opinions,112 a 
phenomenon that persists to the present day.113 The stories of Posner 
and Easterbrook are, of course, familiar ones. At the time of their 
appointments, both were well-known academic scholars at the high-
profile University of Chicago Law School, particularly associated 
with the law and economics movement. They remain senior lecturers 
at Chicago and have produced a stream of scholarly work since 
then.114 The circuit’s reputation has been further burnished by the 
appointment of two other law school professors (Kenneth Ripple and 
Diane Wood).115 While the Seventh Circuit’s meteoric rise in reputa-
                                                                                                                     
 110. For a helpful discussion of this point, see Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission 
of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 181 
(1985). I am not claiming that these attributes and relational explanatory models are 
sharply distinct, for “most of the explanations have variants that come under both head-
ings.” Id. 
 111. Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 4, at 1180 (drawing on conversations with judges 
and academics). 
 112. Id. at 1180-81. 
 113. In recent years the Seventh Circuit has published, on the average, nearly half 
of its appeals decided on the merits, a figure rivaled only by the First Circuit. The 
other circuits typically publish much lower percentages. See JONATHAN MATTHEW 
COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS: THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL 
DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 76-78 tbl.4 (2002) 
(summarizing data from the courts of appeals from 1990 to 2000). During the same 
period, the overall average of published opinions fell from 32% to 20%. See id. at 73-
74. 
 114. A study of the legal scholars most cited in scholarship, using databases from 1956 
to 1999, demonstrated that Posner and Easterbrook ranked first and twenty-first, respec-
tively. Other courts of appeals judges in the top fifty were Guido Calabresi (tenth), Robert 
Bork (sixteenth), and Henry Friendly (twenty-seventh). Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited 
Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 tbl.6 (2000). 
 115. Ripple and Wood were on the faculties of Notre Dame and the University of Chi-
cago law schools, respectively, and were Reagan and Clinton appointees, respectively. For 
a general study of the appointment of legal academics to the U.S. courts of appeals, see 
Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9 (2001). Perhaps the Seventh Circuit’s 
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tion is largely attributable to Posner and Easterbrook,116 it is not 
completely so. The norm for the entire circuit (or at least many of the 
judges thereof) has changed to one where more high-quality, pub-
lishable opinions are produced. 
 Mitu Gulati has suggested that the concept of circuit reputation 
can be profitably analyzed through the concept of circuit norms.117 
Judges on multimember courts do not work in isolation. Over time, 
circuits appear to implicitly develop cultures that manifest them-
selves in various ways. These can include the ideological direction of 
decisions, whether oral argument is preferred, the swiftness of opin-
ion writing and the length and style of opinions, how many are offi-
cially published, proclivity toward en banc review, and a host of other 
factors. No doubt, circuit norms influence judges who join the court 
and in turn are affected or generated by the judges themselves. Life-
tenured federal judges surely are concerned at some level with main-
taining or increasing their own reputation (or influence) and that of 
their circuit.118 They can do that by producing and publishing what 
are perceived to be high-quality opinions.119 Perhaps Posner and 
                                                                                                                     
reputation would be even higher if University of Chicago law professor Antonin Scalia had 
been appointed. According to one source, 
Scalia turned down the Reagan Administration’s first invitation to serve in the 
federal judiciary. Rather than accept the offer to sit on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, Scalia waited patiently for an opening on the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, a more prestigious appellate court and one 
where his expertise in federal administrative law could be put to better use. 
JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST 
COURT 140 (1995) (emphasis added). The episode is similar to Dean Charles Clark re-
sisting FDR’s entreaties to join the D.C. Circuit. Clark eventually accepted an invita-
tion to join the Second Circuit. GOLDMAN, supra note 54, at 26-27. In contrast, Frank 
Easterbrook was more interested in appointment to a “regional” circuit, as opposed to 
the D.C. Circuit, in part because “[a]dministrative law is enjoyable, but a varied diet 
is better.” Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, HOW APPEALING (Aug. 2, 2004), at 
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_08_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html. 
 116. George, supra note 115, at 57-58. 
 117. For further discussion of circuit norms, see Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On 
Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 157, 161; and Gulati & San-
chez, supra note 4, at 1180-81, 1187. For a general discussion of the concept of norms in le-
gal thought, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000). 
 118. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 117-19 (1995) (discussing reputation, pres-
tige, and other utility functions that federal appellate judges seek to maximize). Similarly, 
circuit judges are surely aware of their collective reputation, and it would seem that many 
would endeavor to maintain or improve upon it. See, e.g., Marci Alboher Nusbaum, A Court 
Known for Balance, Intellect, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 2, 2001, at B9 (“Judge Hand’s legacy is a power-
ful presence in the [Second] [C]ircuit and one that the court has proudly tried to live up to.”). 
Perhaps some circuits, such as the First, Second, and D.C., have a greater sense of tradition 
and seek to maintain or inculcate it in various ways, more so than other circuits. 
 119. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 117, at 200-01; Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 4, at 
1180-81. There are other ways in which appellate judges can burnish their reputations. 
One would be contributions to scholarly, academic writing. Another might be for judges to 
hire excellent law clerks who, presumably, think highly of the judge and subsequently cul-
tivate the judge’s image in academia or other circles. Cf. Barry Cushman, Clerking for 
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Easterbrook, explicitly or implicitly, made efforts to change norms on 
the Seventh Circuit.120 
 Whether and to what extent such norms operate in other circuits 
now, or influenced judicial reputation in the past, are subjects worth 
exploring, but ones beyond the scope of this Essay. Nonetheless, we 
can highlight several factors which help explain the historical and, to 
some degree, continued high reputations of the Second and D.C. Cir-
cuits. Those courts share a number of characteristics which suggest 
why they, rather than, say, the Sixth or Tenth Circuits, are at the 
top in rankings of reputations. Most obviously, they sit in cities that 
are the major centers of attention in the United States. The D.C. Cir-
cuit is in the nation’s capital and, as noted earlier, has historically 
been staffed by judges from across the country. The Second Circuit 
sits in New York City, which without overstatement can still be re-
garded in many ways as the commercial, communications, and cul-
tural capital of the country. Presidents have appointed the highest 
percentage of law professors to those circuits, which would tend to 
increase reputation (at least among academics).121 
 Another distinguishing, unique characteristic of the Second and 
D.C. Circuits is comparative regionalization.122 In the other circuits, 
judgeships are allocated by state. In the Sixth Circuit, for example, 
Michigan has six judgeships, Ohio has four, Kentucky has three, and 
                                                                                                                     
Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 738-42 (2003) (book review). Cushman discusses clerks for 
Supreme Court Justices, but his point would seem to apply to lower federal court judges, 
as well. See Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Ap-
proach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259 (2005).  
 Judge Posner has expressed skepticism of the ideal of judges laboring to increase the 
prestige of other judges, which might translate to a skepticism of a judge making particu-
lar efforts to increase the prestige (or reputation) of the circuit: 
Apart from opposing an increase in the number of judges or a dilution of the ti-
tle “judge,” however, there is little an individual judge can do to enhance his 
judicial prestige. That prestige inheres in the whole judiciary. Free-rider prob-
lems make it unlikely that any one judge will exert himself strenuously to raise 
the prestige of all. 
POSNER, supra note 118, at 118. He is in a better position to judge than I, but my sense is 
that most of the relatively small number of lawyers who attain what is regarded as a pres-
tigious position will take cooperative steps to enhance their collective reputation. As one 
example, consider the various efforts of the Judicial Conference of the United States and of 
some individual judges to oppose large-scale expansions of the number of life-tenured fed-
eral judges or to convert non-Article III (that is, non-life-tenured) judges to Article III 
status. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 983-86 (2000). The opposition has been driven, at least 
in part, by the desire of federal judges that “the Article III judiciary must remain relatively 
small to retain the elite status that has traditionally lured first-rate lawyers to the federal 
bench.” HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 385. 
 120. Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 4, at 1180-81. 
 121. George, supra note 115, at 44-45 (collecting data on appointments from FDR to 
Clinton). Law professors constituted 22.2% and 33.3% of the appointees to the Second and 
D.C. Circuits, respectively. The next highest circuit was the Tenth, at 14.3%. Id. at 45 fig.2. 
 122. Thanks to Richard Posner for bringing the point to my attention. 
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Tennessee has three.123 Within each state, tradition or senatorial 
prerogatives may demand that some of those judges come from spe-
cific parts of the state.124 This alone narrows the field of selection. 
Contrast the D.C. Circuit, which is explicitly free of such constraints 
and indeed historically enjoys a norm of being filled by judges from 
across the nation. The Second Circuit has the majority (nine) of its 
judges from New York and has only a handful from the other states, 
Vermont (one) and Connecticut (three). And not coincidentally, the 
elite law schools in New York and Connecticut (for example, Yale) 
supply many of the Second Circuit jurists.125 
 Both circuits have also historically had a disproportionate number 
of what are regarded as important cases on their dockets. For many 
decades in the past century, the Second Circuit considered more 
commercial, copyright, securities, tax, and antitrust cases, as com-
pared to other circuits.126 The D.C. Circuit has long decided a dispro-
portionate number of appeals from often complicated decisions from 
federal administrative agencies, including but not limited to envi-
ronmental cases.127 These types of cases may be thought to be more 
                                                                                                                     
 123. Judges are usually allocated to each state within a circuit based on the cases gen-
erated by each state. There must be at least one judge designated for each state within the 
circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2000). 
 124. See generally GOLDMAN, supra note 54, at 45-48, 89, 136-37, 177, 319-23; Carl To-
bias, Sixth Circuit Federal Judicial Selection, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 721, 746-47 (2003). 
 125. Similar points could be made about the First Circuit, many of whose judges have 
been from Massachusetts and which can draw on the venerable legal tradition of Boston 
and the graduates of Harvard Law School. 
 126. See SCHICK, supra note 59, at 187-88, 309; Lawrence Baum et al., The Evolution of 
Litigation in the Federal Courts of Appeals 1895-1975, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 298 tbl.3 
(1981-82); James H. Carter, They Know It when They See It: Copyright and Aesthetics in 
the Second Circuit, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 773, 773 (1991) (“The Second Circuit is widely 
recognized as the nation’s most important copyright court.”); Erin B. Kaheny, Agenda 
Change in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 275, 286 tbl.6-3, 287 
tbl.6-4 (1999) (documenting that the Second Circuit historically has decided more intellec-
tual property and antitrust cases than other circuits); Posner, supra note 15, at 513 
(“Hand’s copyright opinions [are] generally considered Hand’s finest opinions taken as a 
group . . . .”). 
 127. GOULDEN, supra note 51, at 252-53; HOWARD, supra note 58, at 32; STEFANIE A. 
LINDQUIST ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF CASELOAD BURDEN IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT: REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 9-10 (1999) (on file with author) (finding that in the years 1996 and 1997, ap-
peals from federal administrative agencies made up more than forty percent of the D.C. 
Circuit’s docket; no other circuit exceeded ten percent); Sue Davis & Donald R. Songer, 
The Changing Role of the United States Courts of Appeals: The Flow of Litigation Revis-
ited, 13 JUST. SYS. J. 323, 327 tbl.2 (1988-89) (reporting similar data from 1984); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., The Special Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 90 
GEO. L.J. 779 (2002); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Relationship Between the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit and Its Critics, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 797, 797 (1999) (“I sus-
pect that the D.C. Circuit is second only to the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to the 
volume of critical writing its opinions elicit. That high level of critical attention is to be 
expected independent of the quality of the court’s decisionmaking process. The court’s 
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intellectually interesting or demanding than the typical case that 
appears on a circuit’s docket. Some indirect support for these propo-
sitions is found in the study of Chicago lawyers by John Heinz and 
Edward Laumann. Seeking to examine the comparative reputation of 
different areas of practice, they asked a sample of lawyers and law 
professors to rate the prestige of fields of practice within the profes-
sion.128 Both groups listed securities, tax, antitrust, patent, banking, 
and public utilities as the leaders in prestige.129 
 Yet we should not make too much of comparative docket compo-
sition. Even if historically less noticed, other circuits have in effect 
developed their own specialities—for example, admiralty law in the 
Fifth Circuit and immigration and copyright law in the Ninth Cir-
cuit.130 And “[t]here is nothing particularly remarkable about the 
Seventh Circuit’s docket.”131 More generally, it appears that, over 
time, the docket composition of the circuits has become relatively 
more uniform, although there remain pockets of variation (with the 
D.C. Circuit’s administrative docket being the best example).132 
                                                                                                                     
location in the nation’s capital, combined with its public policy laden docket, renders it a 
tempting target for academic lawyers and political scientists.”). 
 128. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 9, at 90-103 (describing the study). The professors 
in the sample were from Northwestern University. Id. at 101-02. 
 129. Id. at 91 tbl.4.1, 103 tbl.4.3. The Heinz and Laumann study was conducted in the 
late 1970s, but more recent surveys of the Chicago bar have yielded very similar results. 
Sandefur, supra note 9, at 386-87 tbl.1 (reporting the results of a survey conducted in 1995). 
 While patent practice ranks high in prestige, citation analysis of the influence of the 
Federal Circuit (which has exclusively heard appeals of patent cases since 1982) shows 
that it ranks last among the circuits. Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 21, at 317 
tbl.5. This result is not surprising given the highly specialized nature of that court’s work 
product and that it publishes the fewest cases of any circuit. Id. at 303. For evaluations of 
the court, see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in 
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004), and R. Polk Wagner & Lee Pether-
bridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Perform-
ance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004). At any rate, the low influence of the Federal Circuit 
is a good example of how influence and reputation can diverge. 
 130. Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 4, at 1175; William M. Richman & William L. Rey-
nolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradi-
tion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 319 n.220 (1996); see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing 
en banc) (“For better or worse, we [the Ninth Circuit] are the Court of Appeals for the Hol-
lywood Circuit.”); Marilyn F. Johnson et al., In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder 
Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 776 (2000) (suggesting that Ninth Circuit 
decisions on securities litigation will be significant given the presence in that circuit of 
Silicon Valley, home to “companies commonly targeted by attorneys bringing securities 
fraud class actions”). 
 131. Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 4, at 1176. 
 132. Baum et al., supra note 126, at 308; see also DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY 
AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 63 (2000) (explaining that data from 
1970 to 1988 “suggest more similarities than differences in the circuits’ judicial business”); cf. 
Kaheny, supra note 126, at 292-94 (analyzing sample of courts of appeals cases decided between 
1925 and 1998 and finding “some support” for circuit convergence thesis of Baum et al., supra 
note 126, but cautioning that considerable variations still existed among the circuits). 
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 The simple longevity of the apparent high reputation of the Sec-
ond and D.C. Circuits may also be an independent factor in their 
high reputation to date. In law, as in other walks of life, 
“[r]eputations die hard and are long in being born.”133 The modern 
Second and D.C. Circuits may be, in part, free riding on their past 
reputational stock. (Incidentally, this makes the recent rise of the 
heretofore relatively undistinguished Seventh Circuit even more 
striking.) In other words, those circuits can be said to have developed 
a brand, or trademark, the durability of which influences subsequent 
snapshots of reputation.134 In the past two decades, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has developed its own brand. 
 Nonetheless, though I concede that the point is difficult to measure, 
my sense is that the reputation of all of the circuits has become ho-
mogenized in the latter part of the twentieth century. To put the same 
point somewhat differently, it is not so much that the reputations of the 
circuits have risen or fallen, but the entire notion of circuit reputation 
has become blurred and indistinct, at least in the eyes of some observers 
in the legal community. To the extent I am correct about the degrada-
tion of reputation in general, it is perhaps due in part to more lawyers, 
and more judges, trying to keep track of more judges and more cases. 
 When the circuits were first established in 1891, there were nine-
teen authorized judgeships. Congress has incrementally added posi-
tions since then. In the 1930s, during the heyday of Learned Hand’s 
service on the Second Circuit, there were a total of fifty-five judge-
ships, with the largest circuit having five and the smallest, three. As 
late as 1964, there were still only eighty-eight judgeships, and the 
largest circuit only had nine positions. Today, there are 179 author-
ized judgeships, with twenty-eight sitting in the largest circuit (the 
Ninth) and six in the smallest (the First). The average is twelve.135 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Brian Leiter, Measuring the Academic Distinction of Law Faculties, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 451, 455 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Richard Schmalbeck, 
The Durability of Law School Reputation, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568 (1998). 
 134. Cf. Landes, Lessig & Solimine, supra note 21, at 272 (discussing branding theory 
for individual judges). 
 135. For a summary of the information found in this paragraph, see the following table 
reproduced from the COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 46, at tbl.2-2:  
SUMMARY OF AUTHORIZED CIRCUIT JUDGESHIPS 
FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1892-1990 
YEAR LARGEST COURT SMALLEST COURT MODAL COURT TOTAL JUDGESHIPS 
1892 3 2 2 19 
1930 5 3 4 55 
1950 9 3 6 75 
1964 9 3 9 88 
1978 26 4 11 144 
1984 28 6 12 168 
1990 28 6 12 179 
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(These numbers are somewhat misleading, since not all authorized 
positions are always filled, and such positions do not reflect circuit 
judges on senior status who still hear cases.136) Recall the judge who 
said the Ninth Circuit was too big to possess an identifiable circuit 
identity.137 Perhaps the same observation holds true for many of the 
other circuits. 
 Consider, too, the actual or perceived evolution of characteristics 
of judges who make up the circuits. Some part of the reputation of 
the Hand generation of judges was their elite background and educa-
tion. Yet the differences among judges of all of the circuits has 
seemed to moderate over time. To be sure, the Second and D.C. Cir-
cuits historically have had a high percentage of appointees who 
graduated from elite law schools—but the First and Ninth Circuits 
had even higher percentages.138 Likewise, despite recent attention fo-
cused on the subject,139 the federal judicial selection process has al-
ways been, at some level, “political” in nature. This is evidenced by 
the vast majority of appointees having affiliation with the party of 
the appointing President.140 There is also a perception that, especially 
on contentious issues like abortion, the death penalty, and civil 
rights, courts of appeals judges vote on a predictable, political basis—
Republican appointees, conservative, Democratic appointees, lib-
                                                                                                                     
Note: Years 1930-1978 combine the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Court of 
Claims; 1984 and 1990 include the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. COMMISSION 
REPORT, supra note 46, at 13 tbl.2-2. 
 Statutory authorization for judgeships in each circuit is found at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000). 
For an overview of Congressional legislation since the nineteenth century adding U.S. 
Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Court positions, see DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1996). 
 136. For example, as of 1998, reportedly “when one includes senior judges and visiting 
judges, the true number of appellate judges is at least 266 (who are assisted on occasion by 
another 323 district judges).” Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 117, at 172 n.64 (citing a 
statement by Professor Judith Resnik to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals); see also Resnik, supra note 119, at 951 n.92. 
 137. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. But see Richman & Reynolds, supra 
note 130, at 301 (“[T]here is no empirical evidence that additional judgeships will reduce 
prestige or that reduced prestige will diminish the pool of judicial candidates.”). 
 138. See Susan Haire et al., An Intercircuit Profile of Judges on the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals, 78 JUDICATURE 101, 102 tbl.1 (1994). The authors of the study took the list of elite 
law schools (that is, the top twenty-five) from the familiar rankings compiled by U.S. News 
& World Report. 
 139. See, e.g., Online Symposium, The Judicial Confirmations Process: Selecting Federal 
Judges in the Twenty-First Century, Jurist, at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-
jc/index-printer.php (Apr. 15, 2004); Symposium, Federal Judicial Selection in the New Mil-
lennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 583 (2003); Symposium, The Judicial Appointments Process, 
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2001); David C. Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Em-
pirical Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1415 (2005). 
 140. See SONGER ET AL., supra note 132, at 29-45 (analyzing appointments to courts of 
appeals from Coolidge to Reagan); Sheldon Goldman et al., W. Bush Remaking the Judici-
ary: Like Father Like Son?, 86 JUDICATURE 282, 308 tbl.4 (2003) (analyzing the same for 
Carter through the George W. Bush administrations). 
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eral.141 The perception is supported by some evidence,142 though it can 
easily be overstated. Most cases that come before three-judge panels 
are not highly contentious issues, and the large majority of such deci-
sions are unanimous, no matter the ideological makeup of the 
panel.143 While the political nature of a position might attract some, 
                                                                                                                     
 141. For an example from the press, see Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, § 6 (Magazine) at 38, 40 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit is considered the 
shrewdest, most aggressively conservative federal appeals court in the nation.”). 
 142. For a recent high-profile example in the academic literature, see Cass R. Sunstein 
et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 301 (2004) (studying published opinions from 1982 to 2002 and revealing nontrivial 
differences in voting in contentious cases by Republican and Democratic appointees); see 
also Robert A. Carp et al., The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush’s Judicial Ap-
pointees: Far-Right, Conservative, or Moderate?, 88 JUDICATURE 20 (2004) (showing similar 
conclusions with respect to George W. Bush appointees); Nancy Scherer, Blacks on the 
Bench, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 655, 655 (2004-05) (finding that African-American federal judges 
“appear more willing than white judges to accept claims by criminal defendants of police 
misconduct” in search and seizure cases). 
 As Frank Cross has observed, federal judges routinely deny that anything other than 
traditional legal principles guide their decisions. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the 
U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1464-67 (2003). He further suggests, 
“Judges may care about their reputation with the lawyers and litigants who appear before 
them. Dedication to the values of the judicial craft through conscious adherence to the le-
gal model may enhance the judge’s prestige in the legal community.” Id. at 1474-75 (foot-
note omitted). My point is that to the extent it is perceived, rightly or wrongly, that many 
circuit judges vote based on their ideological values, rather than legal precedent, then in 
the eyes of many, their reputation, individually and collectively, will suffer. In this regard, 
it is perhaps significant that there is some statistical evidence that there was relatively 
less difference in voting between Democratic and Republican appointees on the circuits in 
the early part of the century. SONGER ET AL., supra note 132, at 114-16 (analyzing data 
from 1925 to 1988). 
 143. In their recent discussion of, and contribution to, the literature on decisionmaking 
by lower federal court judges, Greg Sisk and Michael Heise remark: 
 With respect to public policy, that judicial ideology may play a role at the 
margins in deciding certain types of controversial court cases cannot be gain-
said. But to suggest that partisan or ideological preferences are prevalent in-
fluences in deciding most cases or are invariably powerful variables in deciding 
even the most controversial and open-ended of legal issues is a dubious ex-
trapolation from the empirical evidence. 
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates 
About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 746 (2005); see also Cross, supra note 
142, at 1514-15 (indicating that in the empirical study of circuit decisionmaking, both legal 
model and judicial ideology play important roles in affecting judicial behavior); Sunstein et 
al., supra note 142, at 336 (“More often than not, Republican and Democratic appointees 
agree with one another, even in the most controversial cases.”). 
 A related point is that there is evidence that recent circuit court appointees are, at ap-
pointment, on average younger than previous appointees. Compare GOLDMAN, supra note 
54, at 354-56 tbl.9.2 (finding that the average ages of circuit appointees of FDR, Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy/Johnson, Nixon/Ford, Carter, and Reagan were 52.9, 55.1, 55.9, 52.7, 
53.4, 51.8, and 50.0, respectively), with Goldman et al., supra note 140, at 308 tbl.4 (find-
ing that the average ages of circuit appointees of George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George 
W. Bush were 48.7, 51.2, and 50.6, respectively). This presumably means that these ap-
pointees may have, on average, longer judicial careers. But it also means that their pres-
tige suffers, or is more difficult to attain, since at least traditionally older judges may be 
considered more distinguished than younger ones. RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD 
AGE 181-82 (1995). Exceptions immediately come to mind (consider Richard Posner, ap-
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it may repel others. Finally, it is worth stating that the earning 
power of circuit judges is not lavish. They currently all earn 
$165,000, which is below many counterparts in the private sector, 
and increases in the twentieth century have only kept up with infla-
tion.144 None of these points mean that circuit judges do not enjoy a 
lofty status in the legal profession. They simply suggest that, in the 
eyes of some, that status has dissipated over the past few decades. 
 The decisional output of the circuits can also be a factor in reputa-
tion being more diffuse. In 1930, less than 3000 cases were filed in 
the courts of appeals; as late as 1960 the figure was less than 4000, 
but it has risen rapidly since then. By the late 1990s, over 50,000 ap-
peals were annually being filed.145 Thus, even though the number of 
judgeships has also risen, the average caseload for each judge has 
risen even faster. In 1960, for example, there were about 50 filings 
annually per judge, a figure that rose to 300 by the late 1990s.146 To 
be sure, not all filings result in an argued case and a decision on the 
merits, much less a published opinion thereafter. But the avalanche 
of opinions, both published and unpublished, produced each year 
surely makes it more difficult than in the past for anyone to follow 
and evaluate the collective work product of a circuit. Practitioners 
(and judges and their clerks) attempt to deal with the problem by us-
ing computerized databases for legal research. But that is not neces-
sarily a panacea. Easier research makes it easier to cite more cases 
in briefs or opinions. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but it might 
suggest that the brand of a particular circuit opinion carries less 
weight than before.147 
                                                                                                                     
pointed at age 42 and still only 66 years old as of this writing, or Frank Easterbrook, ap-
pointed at age 37 and now 56), but they may prove the rule. Posner, supra note 119, at 
1262 n.4. 
 144. POSNER, supra note 36, at 21-33 (discussing extensively the history and present 
status of federal judicial salaries); Albert Yoon, Love’s Labor’s Lost? Judicial Tenure 
Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-2000, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1029, 1032-39 (2003) (same). 
Yoon points to evidence suggesting that recent judicial appointees are generally wealthier 
than before, which is perhaps a reaction to the failure of salaries to significantly rise. Yoon, 
supra, at 1056. On the other hand, federal judges enjoy significant perquisites, including 
control over their schedules, not needing to deal with clients or campaign contributors, the 
use of staff and facilities, and fairly generous retirement and pension payments. Id. at 
1056-57. 
 145. See SONGER ET AL., supra note 132, at 15 tbl.1.2; Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. 
Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 685, 692-94 (2000-2001). 
 146. Cooper & Berman, supra note 145, at 693 n.19. 
 147. Judge Bruce Selya of the First Circuit has made the following argument: 
Computer assisted legal research is much like laundry equipment in this re-
spect. As cases remotely on point become even easier to find, the expectations 
for research rise, courts crank out more opinions, lawyers write more briefs (cit-
ing more opinions), and opinions cite more opinions. The cycle then begins 
anew. All too often, the judges are drained. 
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 A related problem, in the view of some, is what has been colorfully 
labeled as the demise of the Learned Hand tradition. In brief, the ar-
gument runs that the overall quality of appellate opinions has dimin-
ished due in large part to the expanding-per-judge caseload, the 
delegation of opinion writing to law clerks or other circuit staff, and 
the increasing use of visiting judges to fill out many three-judge pan-
els.148 It is not always clear what the critics mean by diminished 
quality. Some have pointed to the increase in recent years of longer, 
colorless, and heavily cited or footnoted opinions.149 The perception of 
a demise in quality of opinions surely has a negative impact on cir-
cuit reputation. There are significant exceptions to these generaliza-
tions. The D.C. Circuit, for example, typically publishes fewer opin-
ions than other circuits150 and typically uses the fewest number of 
visiting judges.151 Nor can it be coincidence that many of the opinions 
of Judges Posner and Easterbrook, in particular, are considered in 
some quarters to be of higher quality than those of their peers.152 
 Finally, changes in the size and shape of the audience may impact 
reputation. The legal profession as a whole has grown in size over the 
past century, has become increasingly specialized, and has become 
more diverse with respect to gender and minority status.153 Perhaps 
the typical practitioner has less need, desire, or leisure time to follow 
                                                                                                                     
 To make matters worse, the quality of legal argumentation sometimes seems 
to vary in inverse proportion to the rate of citation. 
Bruce M. Selya, Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the Informa-
tion Age, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 408 (1994). That said, an overload of cases may resurrect 
notions of reputation. Signals of prestige, such as the author of an opinion or the circuit 
from which it came, may be used as cues of quality, if there are so many opinions poten-
tially to read and cite. POSNER, supra note 9, at 68-69. 
 148. E.g., Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate 
Process: Never Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. REV. 371 (1988); Richman & Reynolds, 
supra note 130, at 275; see also Cooper & Berman, supra note 145, at 690-703. 
 149. POSNER, supra note 36, at 145-57; see also Gulati & Sanchez, supra note 4, at 
1149 (“[T]he ‘best’ opinions are clear, concise, fully theorized, innovative, irreverent, placed 
in historical context, illustrative, and humorous. These are not the characteristics of the 
typical appellate court opinion.”). 
 150. Lindquist, supra note 49, at 28-29. The D.C. Circuit opinions, though, are not 
typically longer or more heavily footnoted than opinions from other circuits. POSNER, supra 
note 36, at 155 n.53. 
 151. MCKENNA, supra note 35, at 38-39; James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Desig-
nated Diffidence: District Court Judges on the Courts of Appeals, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 565, 
572 tbl.2 (2001); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal?: 
An Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United 
States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 351, 367 tbl.2 (1995). 
 152. A market evaluation of this point is provided by the empirical study of Mitu Gu-
lati and Veronica Sanchez, which demonstrated that the opinions of Posner and Easter-
brook are disproportionately selected to appear in law school casebooks. Gulati & Sanchez, 
supra note 4, at 1155-56. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits led in opinions being utilized. Id. 
at 1155. 
 153. For overviews, see Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT 
LAW’S CENTURY 287, 289-94 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 190-93 (1999). 
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or be concerned with the reputation of general jurisdiction courts or 
of the judges that comprise them. This may be true—particularly re-
garding cases that are outside of the practitioner’s speciality. (On the 
other hand, the same phenomenon might accent the reputation of 
circuits in specialized areas—for example, administrative or envi-
ronmental law in the D.C. Circuit and securities law in the Second 
Circuit.) In addition, it cannot be ignored that, until the recent past, 
white males constituted most judges on the circuits, regardless of the 
circuit’s reputation. Perhaps the concept of judicial reputation carries 
less weight for those members of the profession who are from groups 
traditionally underrepresented on the federal bench as a whole or 
among the great judges or circuits in particular.154 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 The reputations of judges and the courts they constitute ebb and 
flow, and those of the United States courts of appeals are no excep-
tion. There has been a good bit of discussion about the reputations of 
these courts but little effort to systematically examine them (as op-
posed to the burgeoning literature on the influence of one judge or 
court on another, often using citation analysis). I have attempted to 
fill some of this gap in the literature. But many questions remain, 
both backward-looking and forward-looking. Regarding the latter, 
further research could more closely examine the origins of the Second 
and D.C. Circuits’ high reputations, and whether such reputations 
were in fact commonly recognized in the pre-World War II era. Mov-
ing closer to the present, one might examine, say, the higher profile 
constitutional law and civil rights cases handled by the circuits since 
the 1950s to determine the effect on reputation. Regarding future de-
velopments, one can wonder how durable will be the reputation of 
the Seventh Circuit, when comes the day when Judges Posner and 
Easterbrook are no longer sitting. Will the much-maligned Ninth 
Circuit eventually have its reputation increase, perhaps (or perhaps 
not) at the expense of other circuits?155 What are likely reputational 
effects of the proposed breakup of the large Ninth Circuit into two or 
three new circuits?156 The difficulty of examining reputation will not 
prevent it from remaining an enduring subject for discussion. 
                                                                                                                     
 154. I make the point with caution, since I am unaware of any rigorous study of this 
point. Likewise, I do not consider changes in other potential audiences, such as federal dis-
trict judges or law school professors. 
 155. Cf. Jeff Chorney, 9th Circuit Dominates the High Court’s Docket, NAT’L L.J., July 
5, 2004, at 6 (stating that the disproportionate number of Ninth Circuit cases reviewed by 
the Supreme Court may be explained by “the West [being] a cultural and economic power-
house, a place where novel legal issues are simply more likely to come up”). 
 156. For a brief discussion of these proposals, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 
53 n.170. For further discussion, see Symposium, Managing the Federal Courts: Will the 
Ninth Circuit Be a Model for Change?, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 315 (2000); Special Issue on 
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 A more basic line of inquiry should focus on the nature of reputa-
tion itself. Despite the historic preoccupation with status and pres-
tige, perhaps those concepts are being deflated or changed, at least 
within some segments of our society, with regard to certain issues. 
Perhaps various shifts in politics, culture, business, and law have 
made reputation—as it was understood in the twentieth century—a 
less viable concept than in our century.157 But these questions, too, 
must await further inquiry. 
 Studying and measuring judicial reputation can also be relevant 
to empirically measuring judicial performance, the subject of the 
symposium in which this Essay appears. Initially, the link may not 
be apparent. Measuring reputation statistically, as distinct from, say, 
measuring influence through citation analysis, may be considered so 
difficult that there is no way to include it as one metric of judicial 
performance, in a tournament of judges or otherwise. It is difficult to 
create precise statistical measures of judicial reputation. But that 
difficulty does not mean it is impossible to utilize reputation of a par-
ticular judge, or of a circuit as a whole, when considering judicial per-
formance. Indeed, before the advent of citation analysis and other 
statistical measures, reputation, imprecise though it is, was the (or 
a) basis for gauging the performance of a judge or court. Perhaps 
surveys of judges and lawyers with regard to reputation could be in-
cluded in measures of judicial performance. 
 Relatedly, scholars should consider the reputation of particular 
judges, and of multimember courts in general, as possible explana-
tory variables in judicial decisionmaking. Perhaps judges or courts 
that enjoy a high (or poor) reputation engage in opinion writing and 
decisionmaking in ways that are distinct—irrespective of statistical 
measures of influence as such.158 With regard to multimember courts, 
incentives to improve or reward performance could or should be 
group-based—especially if appellate judge cooperation is a norm to 
be encouraged. In short, tournaments of judges could be court-based 
as well as judge-specific. In these ways, and perhaps others, judicial 
reputation as a distinct concept can play a useful role in the meas-
urement of judicial performance. 
                                                                                                                     
the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, 15 J.L. & POL. 
379 (1999); and Gary Young, More Proposals to Split the 9th, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 23, 2004, at 
S1. 
 157. See generally NEAL GABLER, LIFE THE MOVIE: HOW ENTERTAINMENT CONQUERED 
REALITY (1998); JOHN SEABROOK, NOBROW: THE CULTURE OF MARKETING, THE MARKETING 
OF CULTURE (2000). 
 158. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Foreseeing Greatness? Measurable Performance Crite-
ria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015 (2005) (taking 
into account the “higher status” of the D.C. Circuit when evaluating Judge Warren Bur-
ger’s service on that court as compared to Judge Harry Blackmun’s service on the Eighth 
Circuit). 
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APPENDIX: THE THIRTEEN FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS 
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